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The traditional theory of expansion modes argue that local experience would bring 
Multinationals (MNEs) more knowledge of the particularities of the local market, 
mitigating subsequent same local expansion risk and will choose greenfield and wholly-
owned subsidiary. However, local complementary inputs become relevant in this 
expansion decision, when local complementary assets are not always available and 
freely negotiated (Hennart, 2009). This paper analyzes the sequential expansion decision 
made by 10 major and large experienced US multinationals in Brazil between 2004 and 
2013, identifying the possible motives for this decision considering MNEs expansion 
theories and Brazilian inter-regions differences. We found evidence that supports 
Hennart Bundling Model: i) the experience of multinationals in Brazil not always 
increases multinationals’ commitment in the host countries by establishment of new 
wholly-owned subsidiaries; ii) US MNEs make acquisitions when they need to enter in a 
new region with significant difference of local economic development from where MNE 
already operated; iii) also, Brazilian regional factors such as concentration, growth and 
industries’ intrinsic features are determinants of  acquisitions and joint ventures choices. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
One stream of research on multinational enterprises 
(MNE) foreign direct investment addresses how 
learning from previous experience conditions the 
likelihood of investing more subsequently. The IB 
literature has generally modeled these experiences 
from the target country and from international 
environment. 
The Uppsala Internationalization approach argues 
that foreign investors with large experience of the 
target country will tend to prefer, ceteris paribus, 
wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOSs) over joint 
ventures (JVs) (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). Firm’s 
own past experiences would provide MNEs good 
knowledge of the best ways to access local assets, 
such as workforce and distribution channel. This 
accumulated knowledge in-house will also allow 
1 Author’s contact: Email: jsampaio82@gmail.com 
MNEs to not need to acquire local firms in their 
sequential local expansion. 
In none of these frameworks do local owners of 
complementary assets seem to play any critical role 
in the foreign investor’s sequential local expansion 
decision. The preceding framework are MNE-centric 
entry models assuming that host countries’ local 
assets (and their strategic advantages) are always 
available and are freely negotiated in the local 
markets. Hennart Bundling Model (Hennart, 2009), 
however, argue that local assets market could be 
inefficient, especially in Emerging markets. 
Consequently, expansion mode may consider local 
complementary inputs owners’ preferences. 
Concentration ratio of an industry and number of 
suppliers have been used as proxies to measure 
difficulty to access local complementary assets 
(Hennart, Sheng and Pimenta, 2015). 
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In addition, the access to the complementary assets 
could become more critical for foreign investor 
decision about the local sequential expansion, when 
the target country is a large continental country with 
significant regional differences. The purpose of this 
paper is therefore to analyze effects of access to local 
complementary inputs on the foreign investor 
expansion in the same target country, identifying how 
it affects MNEs sequential expansion decision. The 
Longitudinal method was applied to study 
transactions carried out by the 10 major US groups in 
Brazil between 2004 and 2013. As there are many 
“Brazis” within Brazil, we expect that significant 
regional differences will contribute to our study 
about necessity of Hennart’s Bundling Model. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature by 
adding regional difference within the same country to 
operationalize the regional imperfect market, that 
could be monopolized by local regional firms. This 
paper also contributes to the discussion of non MNE-
centric theories that focus on the inefficient market 
implication in International Business Model. 
2. LITERATURE 
2.1 MNE’s Expansion Model 
According to traditional theories, MNEs would be 
willing to hold a higher stake in investees to the 
extent they acquire international experience, 
changing from entities that require the execution of 
contracts only (licensing and exportation) to WOS. 
Local expertise would bring MNEs more 
knowledge of the particularities of the local market, 
mitigating subsequent expansion problems. For 
Anderson and Gatignon (1986) and Barkema and 
Vermeulen (1998), experience would bring to MNEs 
knowledge of the best ways to access local assets, 
such as workforce, causing MNEs to be more 
prepared to analyze better acquisition opportunities. 
Other earlier theoretical works have treated 
foreign sequential expansion as a kind of evolutionary 
movement subject to their competitive advantage 
over local firms to reduce the hazard of failure 
(Chang, 1995). The firms will first enter their core 
business in their foreign expansion. After, learning 
from early experience enable them to enter in 
noncore business or into areas of weaker competitive 
advantages. Delios and Beamish (1999) have also 
asserted that foreign investors initially hold small 
equity interests, in particular when they require 
complementary assets to exercise their activities 
abroad (such as natural resources possibly owned by 
local companies, with which MNEs would establish 
JVs). Such interests would increase as a result of the 
enhancement of specificity of the assets transferred 
to their subsidiaries and the international expertise of 
the MNE, as well as the institutional strengthening of 
the environment where they operate. 
In turn, Harzing (2002) has added an important 
variable to the studies on the internationalization of 
companies, that is, the international strategy of the 
MNE, by segregating the strategies adopted into 
global (global operations and standardized global 
production) and “multi-domestic” (primarily 
competing in the domestic market of each host 
country). For the author, the strategy adopted would 
influence MNEs entry and expansion modes choices. 
In contrast to theses traditional theories that still 
relied on the assumption that local complementary 
assets are always available and freely negotiated in 
host markets, Hennart (2009) has refuted MNE-
centric theories and asserted that the MNE entry and 
expansion strategies also relies on the easy access 
and tradability of local assets. The author has stressed 
that local complementary assets have owners and 
that the access to such assets entails transactional 
costs, which impact MNEs entry and expansion 
choices. 
Hennart has mentioned as examples of local 
complementary assets that affect the decisions made 
by MNEs: (i) location, quoting Wal-Mart, which faced 
problems in Germany since it was not allowed to 
acquire big plots of land, necessary for the 
establishment of its stores; (ii) distribution, whose 
access can be restricted due to the shortage of 
distributors or the poor quality of services; (iii) 
workforce, stressing that the access to such asset can 
be more difficult in markets comprising companies 
with large concentration of workers; (iv) regulatory 
licenses and permits, that can be obtained directly 
from local governmental agencies or negotiated 
among the sector companies; and (v) local consumer 
market and the relationship of consumers with 
specific companies. As one of the problems to be 
faced by MNEs in this sense, the author mentions the 
relationship of consumers with specific brands, 
whose solution would be the acquisition of such 
brands by new entrants. 
Thus, and considering that, especially in emerging 
countries, markets are defective; and that entry and 
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expansion modes adopted by MNEs in foreign 
markets relies on the efficiency of the local market in 
terms of negotiation of such local complementary 
assets, he proposed his Bundling Model, as shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
Knowledge assets held by MNE 
Easy 
to transact 
Difficult 
to transact 
Complementary 
assets held by 
local owners 
Easy to 
transact 
Indeterminate 
Wholly-owned 
affiliate  
of the MNE 
Difficult 
to transact 
Wholly-owned 
operations of 
local firm 
Joint Venture 
between MNE 
and local firms 
Fig. 1 
Optimal mode of foreign market entry (“Bundling Model”) 
Source: Hennart (2009) 
The author has also asserted that: (i) acquisition is the 
most efficient approach when local complementary 
assets cannot be separately acquired, but the market 
for firms is efficient; and (ii) MNEs with diversified 
activity choose to carry out acquisitions rather than 
greenfields (since they could overlap their diversified 
approaches with the most varied types of companies 
and activities, without necessarily changing them). 
Hennart's theory, with respect to the market entry 
mode adopted by foreign investors, was tested in 
Brazil by Hennart, Sheng and Pimenta (2015), who 
concluded that the number of suppliers available and 
the concentration of the industry significantly affect 
the entry mode adopted by MNEs (if by way of 
greenfields or acquisitions or JVs or WOSs). 
With respect to the subsequent expansion of 
MNEs in host countries, Hennart (2009) has asserted 
that the mode selected to expand host-market 
activities is also related to knowledge held by MNEs 
(and the costs to transact them) and the access to 
local complementary assets, refuting the traditional 
theories when affirming that MNEs expansion modes 
could differ from that proposed (which would give 
rise to the establishment of WOS) and could also be 
inverted, with a lower interest held by MNEs in cases 
where their knowledge would become easily 
negotiable but the access to local complementary 
assets not. The expansion of MNEs over time would 
depend on the evolution in efficiency for accessing 
local assets and transferring knowledge, as shown in 
Figure 2. 
 
Knowledge assets held by MNE 
Become 
available or 
easier to imitate 
Remains difficult 
to transact 
Access to 
complementary 
assets held by 
local owners 
Becomes 
easy 
Indeterminate 
Increases 
control - 
become WOS 
Still 
difficult 
MNE footprint 
may shrink 
(evolves to 
contractual sales 
and licensing) 
Joint ventures 
or acquisitions 
Fig. 2 
Bundling Model applied to expansion  
Source: Own elaboration using Hennart’s propositions (2009). 
Therefore, the expansion of MNEs would arise from 
changes in asset transaction costs of both sides. 
Hennart has also acknowledged that the 
complementary assets necessary for the 
performance of activities of MNEs vary according to 
their industry. 
2.2 Characteristics of the Brazilian market and 
regional differences  
MNEs activities and performance are affected by host 
country institutional factors, specially by those 
related to political and economic uncertainties, 
institutional inefficiencies and disparities (Liu, Gao, Lu 
& Lioliou, 2016). 
Brazil, one of the largest emerging market, was in 
2015 the eighth biggest recipient of foreign 
investments in the world, a rank that highlights the 
significance of the Brazilian market for foreign 
investors (UNCTAD, 2016). Before the current 
economic crisis, in 2013, the country managed to be 
the fifth biggest recipient in the world (UNCTAD, 
2014). However, factors such as complex regulation, 
bureaucracy and the delay of governmental agencies 
(both in terms of implementation of new activities, 
upon the granting of licenses and permits, and in 
terms of enforcement of the regulation), are 
perceived as problems faced by companies operating 
in the country. In this regard, Estrin and Prevezer 
(2011) make important considerations on problems 
faced by companies formally established in the 
country. 
In the case of some industries, such as mineral 
extraction, power and petrochemical segments, 
highly regulated (depending on operating permits, 
license or concessions for exploitation), and 
historically concentrated (led by companies 
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associated with the government, such as former 
government-owned Vale do Rio Doce, privatized in 
1997, and Petrobras, still controlled by the federal 
government), the problems faced consists in true 
obstacles for the performance of such activities, in 
particular by foreign investors. 
Within such context, the country is ranked 123th 
(of 190 countries) in the current “Ease of Doing 
Business in Brazil” ranking, behind countries like 
Zambia and Honduras, which, coupled with the 
abovementioned factors, stresses the problems 
faced by MNEs to access local complementary inputs 
and to fully adapt their activities to the local context. 
It is also worth pointing out that the country is ranked 
175th in terms of “starting a business”, 172th in terms 
of “dealing with construction permits” and 181st in 
terms of “paying taxes” (World Bank, 2017). 
With regard to market for firms, notwithstanding 
the fact that the ownership structure of Brazilian 
companies is primarily concentrated and family-
related, there are no legal prohibitions to the 
acquisition of companies, except for transactions 
that, owing to their size or stakeholders, should be 
submitted to the approval of the Brazilian 
administrative council for economic defense 
(Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica - 
CADE), and those requiring the approval of specific 
regulatory bodies, such as banks. In 2013, Brazil 
registered 812 transactions involving the purchase of 
noncontrolling, controlling or total ownership 
interest in the Brazilian market, of which 323 involved 
foreign companies (PWC, 2014). In 2016, the country 
registered 597 transactions, of which 255 involved 
foreign companies (PWC, 2016). 
One of the oddest features of the Brazilian market 
is precisely the huge disparity between Brazilian 
regions (including social and economic indicators), 
which creates various “Brazils” inside one single 
country. In this sense, we may quote the article in 
“The Economist” magazine (2011), which compared 
Brazilian states with countries, based on its 
population, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and GDP 
per capita. Whereas the Southeast region was 
compared to countries such as Hungary, Singapore or 
Poland, some states in the Northeast region were 
compared to Cambodia and even Afghanistan. 
Specific industry characteristics in Brazilian regions 
In their works, Oliveira Júnior (2006) and Ardissone 
(2009) conclude that the decision on the industrial 
location is intrinsically related to the characteristics of 
each industry, such as the presence of factors of 
production, tax incentives, salary costs, proximity 
with the market and existing plants. In this regard, we 
could cite recent cases of MNEs strategies in Brazil, 
such as the installation in 2013 of a Kimberly-Clark 
unit in the state of Bahia (Camaçari). The new unit 
was designed to expand the MNE’s business in the 
North and Northeast regions, and its location was 
chosen due to the existence, in Camaçari, of some of 
Kimberly-Clark suppliers, located in the new region’s 
“Polo Acrílico”. The decision to focus on the 
Northeast region was also based on the rapid growth 
of the local consumer market (Gente e Mercado, 
2011). 
Despite some recent changes, the Brazilian industry 
is historically concentrated in the Southeast region, in 
particular in the cities of São Paulo, Belo Horizonte 
and Rio de Janeiro. Indeed, the Metropolitan Region 
of São Paulo only concentrated 15.8% of the jobs in 
the industry in 2007 (Saboia, 2013), and in 2010, the 
state of São Paulo was responsible for 30% of the 
totality of industrial jobs in Brazil (Sobrinho, Azzoni, 
2015).  Table 1 shows the share of each region in the 
Brazilian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 2003 to 
2014. 
Tab. 1 
Brazilian regions participation in Brazilian GDP (2003-2014) 
Regions 
Participation in GDP (%) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Brazil 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
North 4,8 4,9 5 5,1 5 5,1 5 5,3 5,5 5,4 5,5 5,3 
Northeast 12,8 12,7 13,1 13,1 13,1 13,1 13,5 13,5 13,3 13,6 13,6 13,9 
Southeast 55,8 55,8 56,5 56,8 56,4 56 55,3 56,1 56,1 55,9 55,3 54,9 
South 17,7 17,4 16,6 16,3 16,6 16,6 16,5 16 15,9 15,9 16,5 16,4 
Central-West 9 9,1 8,9 8,7 8,9 9,2 9,6 9,1 9,1 9,2 9,1 9,4 
Source: IBGE - Regional Accounts, 2012, 2014 
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Only 6 out of the 25 main industrial mesoregions 
were located outside the South/Southeast axis in 
2007 (Saboia, 2013). The South region showed a very 
peculiar industrialization process: it was initially 
developed by way of industries created by regional 
entrepreneurs, strongly influenced by immigrants 
and focused on agricultural raw materials. 
On the other hand, the North and Northeast 
regions still show social and economic indicators 
comparable to those of developing countries and 
relatively low industrial and economic growth. 
North’s industrialization derived from governmental 
plans and began upon the creation of the Manaus 
Free Trade Zone in 1967, but it still shows problems 
such as the distance from consumer centers and lack 
of transportation. The Central-West region has been 
changing its growth patterns over the past years; 
some companies were established in such region to 
carry out the on-site processing of cotton, soybean, 
corn, leather and meat, also attracting other service 
providers and input suppliers. Table 2 contains data 
on the share of regions in the gross added value at 
basic prices per economic activity, relating to 2012. 
Tab. 2 
Regions’ shares in the gross added value 
at basic prices per economic activity (2014) 
Big  
Regions 
Share in the gross added value at basic prices 
Extraction 
industries 
Transformation 
industries 
Electricity,  
gas and  
water supply 
Trade 
Brazil 100 100 100 100 
North 9,1 4,4 7,4 5,1 
Northeast 6,3 9,1 16,3 15,7 
Southeast 82,5 56,4 44,8 50,8 
South 1,0 24,3 19,4 18,9 
Central-West 1,2 5,7 12,1 9,4 
Source: IBGE - Regional Accounts, 2014 
With respect to the business acquisition market, it 
should be pointed out that 68,6% of the 813 
abovementioned transactions in 2013 were carried 
out in the Southeast region (PWC, 2014). In 2016, 
64% of the 597 transactions were carried out in the 
Southeast region (compared to 2% in the North 
region, 4% in the Midwest region, 16% in the South 
region and 6% in the Northeast region). Only the state 
of São Paulo carried out 49% of the total transactions 
(PWC, 2016), equally showing the disparity between 
Brazilian regions (PWC, 2013). 
Given these significant regional differences in the 
country, the penetration in new regions could pose 
new problems concerning the access by MNEs to 
complementary assets. Hence, in accordance with 
Hennart’s model (2009), they would be inclined to 
carry out new acquisitions and JVs to access such 
complementary inputs and consolidate in local 
markets. 
In an empirical econometric study of the entry 
mode chosen by firms investing in Brazil, Hennart, 
Sheng & Pimenta (2015) found that the low number 
of suppliers (and, therefore, the low availability of 
raw materials and other inputs, such as electricity, 
gas and water supply in the regions North and 
Northeast, as shown in Table 2) represents difficulty 
in the access of complementary local inputs and 
affects MNE’s strategies, causing them to establish 
JVs in their entry into new markets. 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In order to analyze the expansion choices of MNEs 
and the possible factors behind such decision, we 
conducted a longitudinal study on the exploratory-
descriptive nature, analyzing transactions carried out 
by the 10 major US MNEs operating in the country 
between 2004 and 2013, in particular in light of the 
Bundling Model designed by Hennart. We assumed 
that all these groups enjoy very mature local and 
global business and have learned from their own 
experience in operating in Brazil. 
To this end, we are based on the following criteria: 
(i) inclusion in the sample of US MNEs only (the 
decision to restrict the analysis to one home country 
and one host country excludes possible cultural bias 
arising from one or another); (ii) delimitation of the 
period between 2004 and 2013 (also to mitigate a 
potential bias arising from the period analyzed); and 
(iii) analysis of transactions carried out in Brazil only, 
taking into account that this study is only interested 
in examining how the characteristics of the Brazilian 
market influence the decision-making process in 
connection with the expansion modes of MNEs in 
Brazil. 
We selected the 10 major multinational groups 
whose capital originates from the United States 
operating in Brazil, according to the gross revenue 
ranking disclosed by Valor Econômico (Valor Grandes 
Grupos magazine). However, we excluded from the 
sample companies operating in the financial sector, 
since we understand that such sector has very 
specific characteristics, that could change some of 
the projected results. We also excluded the Mosaic 
group, since such group originated from a JV between 
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Cargill group, which was already included in the 
sample, and IMC Global group. Consequently, we 
selected: Wal-Mart; AES, Cargill, Whirlpool, DuPont, 
DOW, Alcoa, Dixie Toga, Dana and Plascar. 
3.1 Data 
Data collection primarily was based on: the 
information disclosed in reports by the companies 
themselves; proceedings analyzed by CADE; 
Thomson Reuters’ database on acquisitions and JVs; 
and data published by the IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estatística). We also collected 
information disclosed by the National Investment 
Information Network (RENAI), relating to the period 
between 2004 and 2013, comprising expansion and 
implementation investment projects. 
In order to verify the major regional differences in 
the country and the characteristics of groups’ 
operating sectors, we analyzed existing studies and 
collected data disclosed by specialized magazines and 
by national industries’ associations, such as the 
Brazilian Association of the Chemical Industry 
(ABIQUIM), the Brazilian Supermarket Association 
(ABRAS), the Brazilian Packaging Association (ABRE), 
etc. We also checked the level of concentration of 
each industry (obtained from the IBGE, being 
understood that the higher the concentration the 
more difficult the access to complementary inputs 
would be). Tables 3 and 4 summarizes a few data 
relating to the MNEs and the industry of their core 
activities. 
The transactions carried out by each one of the 
groups were classified as JV or WOS, and acquisition 
or greenfield. For purposes of simplification, 
acquisition means total or partial acquisition of the 
share capital of a given company, and greenfield is 
considered in a broad sense, meaning investments in 
new projects by companies rather than in the 
acquisition of existing structures. JVs represents 
interest in companies of up to 95% of total capital, 
sharing capital with other partners, and or WOS, 
interest in the subsidiary above 95% of total capital. 
Finally, we verified if the transaction was carried 
out in the same Brazilian microregions where the 
MNE already operated, or if the transaction was 
carried out in a region where it did not operate yet (in 
other regions), if it was carried out within the core 
activity of the group and if it involved local 
companies/players or other MNEs operating in Brazil. 
Tab. 3 
Groups, industries and concentration ratio C4 and C8 index (2014) 
Group and Year of Entry Industry C4 C8 
AES (1996) Electricity production, distribution and supply 19,6 32,2 
Alcoa (1965) Mining and quarrying industry 66,6 73,6 
Basic metals 19,2 26,8 
Cargill (1965) Food insdustry 10,5 15,1 
Dana (1957) e Plascar (2006) Motor vehicles and autoparts 14,3 21,8 
Dixie (1998) Rubber and plastic products/Packages 4,7 7,4 
Dow (1956) e DuPont (1937) Chemical and petrochemical 7,2 12 
Wal-Mart (1994) Retail (Supermarkets) 59,3 63,8 
Whirlpool (1957) Electrical machinery and apparatus 51,5 63,9 
Source: IBGE - Regional Accounts, 2014 
 
Tab. 4 
Groups, industries and concentration ratio C4 and C8 index (2014) 
Group and Year of Entry Industry Growth 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
AES (1996) Electricity production, distribution and supply 1,1 8,2 7,5 8,0 8,4 
Alcoa (1965) Mining and quarrying industry -2,7 -26,1 56,8 33,8 -15,3 
Basic metals 20,6 -23,7 10,7 9,6 2,6 
Cargill (1965) Food insdustry 24,4 10,4 4,5 19,2 14,2 
Dana (1957) e Plascar (2006) Motor vehicles and autoparts 19,3 -3,3 20,2 10,4 0,5 
Dixie (1998) Rubber and plastic products/Packages 14,7 1,3 14,4 12,7 7,4 
Dow (1956) e DuPont (1937) Chemical and petrochemical 13,8 -5 2,5 12,8 12,9 
Wal-Mart (1994) Retail (Supermarkets) 22,3 17,5 17,6 14,9 17,2 
Whirlpool (1957) Electrical machinery and apparatus 18,6 3,9 14,6 5,6 9 
Source: Own elaboration, from IBGE (Annual Survey of Industry) and ANEEL data 
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4. ANALYSIS OF RECENT EXPANSION  
OF US MULTINATIONAL GROUPS IN BRAZIL 
The research conducted produced data relating to 
106 transactions carried out by US multinational 
groups in Brazil within 10 years, of which 76 
transactions were carried out through greenfield, 30 
through acquisitions, 41 through JVs and 65 through 
WOSs. 101 were carried out inside the same region(s) 
where the groups already operate (also including in 
such category those transactions carried out 
nationwide, considering that, in such cases, the 
matter relating to the specific access to the 
complementary assets of a new region is not 
relevant) and 5 in other Brazilian regions, as shown in 
the Table 5. 
Based on all information obtained, on MNEs 
expansion theories (in particular the Bundling 
Model), on Brazilian nation- and region-wide context 
and also on the characteristics of each industry of the 
MNEs analyzed, we present a few considerations with 
respect to the results obtained. 
4.1 Transactions carried out in other regions 
Notwithstanding the fact that the large majority of 
transactions (101) was carried out inside the same 
region where the groups already operated, 5 
expansion transactions were carried out in other 
Brazilian regions. 
Given that Brazilian regions show considerable 
social, economic and cultural differences among each 
other, it is possible to assume that the entry in a new 
region would entail new accesses to the specific local 
complementary inputs of that region. Such 
complementary assets can be related both to the 
availability of resources and the size/growth of the 
local market and possible efficiency gains. 
Considering that in the majority of the cases: (i) 
the individual access to such complementary assets 
may be very difficult for new players, owing to the 
national and regional characteristics already 
described; and (ii) such complementary assets would 
be embedded in companies that already operate in 
the region where the expansion is carried out, 
according to Hennart's Bundling Model, such new 
accesses would be achieved through acquisitions. 
Indeed, it was possible to observe that the 5 
transactions carried out in regions other than those 
where the multinational groups already operated 
involved acquisitions, as shown below: 
(i) acquisitions by DOW of Agromen's corn 
production divisions in Brazil and of and Globe 
Metais, a silicon producer, one of the main raw 
materials used in DOW's products. In 2007, DOW, 
through its subsidiary DOW Agrosciences, has 
acquired 100% of Agromen Sementes Agricolas, 
Agromen's corn division, aiming the 
development, planting, processing and 
production of hybrid corn seeds. Agromen was 
located in the Southeast and Central-West 
regions and was up to then the biggest corn seed 
producer in the country. 
DOW's strategy upon the acquisition was to find a 
vector for one of the genes produced by its 
Agroscience arm and strengthen its business in the 
corn market (including for purposes of export, aiming 
at producing seed-made biofuel). Through the 
acquisition, DOW has expanded its business in the 
sector and was ranked 3rd in terms of market share in 
Tab. 5 
Transactions carried out within the same region and in other regions by MNEs 
MNEs 
Same region(s) Other Region 
Total 
Greenfield Acquisition JV WOS Greenfield Acquisition JV WOS 
AES 12 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 12 
Alcoa 10 2 4 8 0 0 0 0 12 
Cargill 21 14 12 23 0 0 0 0 35 
Dana 3 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 4 
Dixe-Toga 2 5 4 3 0 0 0 0 7 
DOW 7 2 3 6 0 2 0 2 11 
DuPont 4 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 4 
 Plascar 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 
 Wal-Mart 10 0 0 10 0 3 1 2 13 
 Whirl-pool 5 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 5 
Total 76 25 40 61 0 5 1 4 106 
Source: Own elaboration, from IBGE (Annual Survey of Industry) and ANEEL data 
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the country (GEEIN Unesp, 2007 and Revista Dinheiro 
Rural, 2007). Hence, it has quickly assumed an 
important position in a sector that was not one of its 
main operating sectors and obtained access to 
specific complementary assets not yet held by it. 
In 2009, DOW also acquired 100% of Globe Metais 
Indústria (belonging to the Brazilian Camargo Corrêa 
group), a silicon producer, one of the main raw 
materials used in DOW's products. For DOW, the 
acquisition represented an opportunity to gain access 
to one of the main raw materials necessary for its 
production process. Indeed, the acquisition strategy 
was precisely to increase the efficiency of its 
production process, by enabling a “more efficient and 
stable” supply of silicon metal (Fator Brasil magazine, 
2009). 
It is possible to describe as factors that gave rise 
to this acquisition by DOW: (i) the target was one of 
the main producers of silicon, the basic raw material 
of its products (access to competitive raw material is 
described as one of the major challenges in the sector 
– ABIQUIM, 2013); and (ii) Globe Metais was located 
in another region, in the Northern part of Brazil 
(Pará), which is considered ideal for the production of 
silicon due to the existence of more deposits at the 
site and availability of electric power. The production 
of silicon is historically concentrated in the state of 
Minas Gerais, in the Southeast region. In light of the 
foregoing, it is possible to affirm that DOW 
consummated such acquisition so as to facilitate its 
access to complementary assets, available in a 
different region. 
(ii) acquisitions by Wal-Mart of the Bompreço 
supermarket chain and partnership with Unibanco 
for the development of Hipercard and acquisition 
of Sonae chain. After entering Brazil through a JV 
with Lojas Americanas in 1995, which 
represented for  the group “a security against 
political risks” and for its Brazilian partner 
“technology and know-how” (Minadeo and 
Camargos, 2009), and, after acquiring, in 1998, 
the remaining ownership interest (becoming a 
WOS), Wal-Mart quickly consolidated its 
operations in the competitive supermarket 
sector, characterized by rapid growth, 
consolidation and increasing participation of 
foreign groups, with many mergers and 
acquisitions over the past years (ABRAS, various 
years). 
The group has initially concentrated its activities in 
the Southeast region. In 2004, it has expanded its 
operations and started its expansion and 
consolidation in other Brazilian regions, by acquiring 
from Dutch Ahold the Northeastern Bompreço chain 
(which itself also had a recent past of acquisitions). 
Such acquisition enabled Wal-Mart to penetrate the 
market in the Northeast region - which was more 
concentrated than national average and historically 
controlled by local traditional chains, such as Paes 
Mendonça, former owner of Bompreço. After the 
purchase of Bompreço, Wal-Mart accounted 163 
stores and its annual revenues grew from R$1.7 
billion to R$5 billion (Minadeo and Camargos, 2009).  
The acquisition also resulted in a partnership with 
Unibanco, a Brazilian bank, for the operation of the 
Hipercard credit card business, privileging the 
performance by Wal-Mart of activities other than its 
core activity. 
In 2005, the group acquired stores from 
Portuguese group Sonae, which enabled its 
penetration in South region’s market. By then, Sonae 
had already carried out various acquisitions, including 
traditional family-managed chains in the region, 
helding an important position in that local market. 
After such acquisition, Wal-Mart assumed in 2006 the 
second position in the sector in Brazil, outshining 
other foreign chains long established in the country, 
such as Carrefour. 
Therefore, acquisitions represented for Wal-Mart 
valuable opportunities to obtain privileged access to 
the complementary assets necessary for its 
expansion in the South and Northeast, by means of 
the acquisition of chains that were already 
established in their local markets (which, since it was 
traditionally concentrated and up to then controlled 
by local chains, posed obstacles for new players, e.g., 
in terms of access to consumers and local suppliers). 
If carried out otherwise, the access to local assets 
could be time-consuming (big disadvantage in 
markets that show quick growth, such as the 
supermarket sector) and burdensome. 
Citing the specific case of Bompreço’s acquisition, 
it is worthy to mention that, being the absolute leader 
in its sector the Northeast, Bompreço was considered 
a barrier to other participants entry, specially due to 
its efficient logistics chain, consolidated relationship 
with suppliers, strong brands (such as Bompreço 
itself, Bomclube and Hipercard) and strategic 
locations (Pinto, 2000). The local consumer market 
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had such a strong identification with the Bompreço 
brand that even today Wal-Mart´s stores remain 
under the Bompreço brand. 
Hence, analyzing the case of Wal-Mart under 
Hennart's theory, acquisition was chosen since the 
complementary assets needed (such as the specific 
knowledge of the local consumer market and 
suppliers) were difficult to access and were 
embedded in the companies acquired. It is also 
possible to affirm that total acquisition was preferred 
to JVs because the group acquired companies in its 
own segment (in which it already had extensive 
knowledge and other important assets). As such, the 
assets acquired could be easily integrated with other 
assets and knowledge already held by Wal-Mart (they 
had “Modularity”, according to Hennart). 
4.2 Transactions carried out in the same region 
Greenfields/WOSs 
Under Hennart's Bundling Model, it is possible to 
conclude that transactions carried out by MNEs 
inside the same region where they already operate 
would tend to be carried out through greenfields, 
since it would not be necessary to “gain” new 
accesses to local complementary inputs (often 
embedded in already operating companies). 
Likewise, since MNEs knowledge tend to remain 
difficult to access, but local complementary assets 
not, MNEs would be inclined to make investments 
through WOSs. 
In fact, it is possible to note that the large majority 
of the transactions carried out by the groups in the 
regions where they already operated, in the period 
analyzed, was carried out through greenfields (76) 
and WOSs (61). 
In the case of Wal-Mart, after its initial JV and 
acquisitions in the Northeast and South regions, and 
after gaining experience and consolidating its 
activities in the local markets, becoming an important 
player in the sector on a nationwide basis, it started 
to exclusively carry out greenfields and WOSs, upon 
the opening of new units (including branches and 
distribution centers in various cities) and expansion 
of its operating lines. 
Dixie-Toga, Dana and Whirlpool groups, which 
started to operate through JVs with domestic groups, 
acquired afterwards the remaining stake in the 
companies and changed their activities into WOSs. 
For example, Dana started to operate in Brazil 
through an acquisition/JV, after acquiring, in 1957, a 
stake in Albarus, a renowned Brazilian company 
operating in the autoparts sector. Ten years later, it 
acquired the company's shareholding control. The 
Bundling Model could be applied to those cases in the 
sense that, in order to access complementary assets 
held by other groups, the MNEs have entered into 
partnerships with them and, thereafter, with the 
access to complementary assets already consolidated 
and facilitated (and on total possess of its own 
knowledge), they elected to fully assume the business 
from their partners. 
AES started to operate in Brazil through a series of 
acquisitions and JVs in the Brazilian electric power 
sector, highly regulated and recently subject to a 
phase of transformations and privatizations. Such 
acquisitions included: part of state-owned Light in 
1996 (in a consortium with French EDF and US 
Houston Industries Energy); part of CEMIG in 1997 (in 
another consortium with US Southern Eletric and 
Brazilian bank Opportunity); Companhia Centro-
Oeste de Distribuição de Energia Elétrica in 1997; and 
the shareholding control of Eletropaulo 
Metropolitana in 1998 (in a consortium with 
Houston, EDF and Brazilian Companhia Siderúrgica 
Nacional). Finally, in 2003 it has created the holding 
Companhia Brasiliana de Energia, which controls the 
group business, in which BNDESPAR is the other 
shareholder 
After such acquisitions, which enabled AES to 
access the local assets needed (especially critical and 
specific regulatory requirements, such as permits for 
the exploration and distribution of power), and after 
consolidating its activities in the country, AES chose 
to carry out its transactions in the analyzed period 
through greenfields. 
Acquisitions/JVs 
Notwithstanding the explanations above, we verified 
that some of the groups, even when expanding inside 
the regions where they already operated, established 
JVs and carried out acquisitions. Indeed, 25 
transactions carried out between 2004 and 2013 
inside the same region were acquisitions and 40 were 
JVs. 
Such acquisitions and JVs evidences that, besides 
the region, other factors can be additionally 
described as drivers for the expansion alternatives of 
MNEs. More specifically, based on the analysis of the 
total context of transactions carried out, we noted 
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that other factors can prevent the access of MNEs to 
the complementary assets needed, leading 
companies to carry out acquisitions and/or JVs to 
access such assets, such as, for example: 
(i) problems underlying the operating sectors, such 
as sectors “pressured” between suppliers and 
consumers, or regulated (that require the 
obtaining of licenses and permits). We can here 
mention the case of Dixie-Toga (Bemis), which 
had consolidated its activities in the domestic 
market through acquisitions and JVs, such as the 
establishment of Laminor together with Finnish 
Huhtamaki and the acquisition of packaging 
divisions from other MNEs (such as Alcoa and 
Alcan in 2004 and 2010). This could be explained 
by the sector in which it operates – being the 
“pressured” link of the chain, between suppliers 
and customers with high bargaining power (FIPE, 
2008) – where raw material suppliers and the 
consumer/distributor network would be 
complementary assets difficult to access by new 
players, leading them to consolidate through 
acquisitions and JVs. 
We could also mention the case of AES which, 
operating in a highly regulated sector, penetrated 
Brazilian markets through acquisitions and JVs with 
Brazilian and foreign groups; and the case of Alcoa, 
which, in order to operate in the power sector, 
established JVs (Machadinho Consortium, Estreito 
Energia – CESTE and Maesa) and, to consolidate some 
activities in its own sector, has invested in JVs, such 
as the Alumar Consortium. 
(ii) engagement of the MNEs in new activities, other 
than its core activity. We can here cite the 
transactions carried out by Cargill, in 2013 the 5th 
largest exporter among the companies located in 
Brazil (MDIC/SECEX, 2013) and the company that 
carried out more acquisitions and transactions 
among the multinational groups analyzed. 
When Cargill invested in activities other than its core 
activities, carried out acquisitions and JVs. It 
penetrated in the sugar and alcohol markets through 
acquisitions and JVs (with Brazilian Moema in 2006; 
with Canagril, after the acquisition of part of CEVASA 
in 2007; with Moema and other suppliers in Itapagipe 
plant; and also with Brazilian USJ group) and acted 
likewise in the export business (in TIS, establishing a 
JV with Brazilian Crystalsev and Ultra; in Terminal 
Exportador de Álcool de Santos, acquired a stake in a 
JV with Cosan and Crystalsev; and in Terminal 
Exportador do Guarujá, in a JV with French Louis 
Dreyfus). 
It should be mentioned again the transactions 
carried out in the power sector by Alcoa, and also: by 
DOW, for purposes of consolidation in the corn 
production sector (upon acquisition of Agromen and 
Coodetec); and by DuPont, which established a JV 
with a foreign group (Bunge) for the export and 
import of commodities. 
Likewise, companies that operate in sectors with 
a higher level of concentration (the case of mineral 
extraction and metallurgy, electric power, 
supermarket and home appliances, represented by 
Alcoa, AES, Wal-Mart and Whirlpool, respectively), in 
expansion performed inside the sector and region in 
which they primarily operate, it was also possible to 
note a trend in the sense of carrying out acquisitions 
and establishing JVs to penetrate and consolidate in 
their core industries. After granting a leading position 
in the market (and already having full access to local 
complementary assets), the MNEs started to carry 
out greenfield investments. 
It is also possible to observe that, even 
maintaining their own characteristics (considering its 
FSAs) and continuing to operate in the same region 
where they already operate, the MNEs can change 
their strategies, as a result of the characteristics of 
the markets in which they operate and the ease or 
difficulty to access the local complementary assets 
needed. 
4.3 Other results 
Transactions carried out by some of the groups also 
provided evidence to traditional theories, in the 
sense that the increase in the experience of the MNEs 
in the host country would also increase its 
commitment, leading them to expand through WOSs. 
In such sense, we may cite the cases of Dixie-Toga, 
Dana, Wal-Mart and Whirlpool, which started to 
operate through JVs and, thereafter, acquired the 
remaining stake in the companies and changed their 
activities into WOSs. However, such characteristic 
was only noted in those 4 groups, and in other cases, 
groups operating in Brazil for a long time continued 
to establish JVs (such as Cargill). 
Such results do not invalidate the evidence about 
the application of Hennart's theory. In fact, it is 
possible to also state that the 2 principles are, in 
those cases, complementary – the experience in the 
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host country would facilitate the access to local 
complementary assets, enabling the MNEs to 
establish WOSs; for this reason, both theories are 
applicable. 
With respect to Harzing’s theory (2002), we noted 
that companies with a more “global” production in 
fact show some characteristics during their expansion 
process that differentiate them from other “multi-
domestic” companies. Companies such as Alcoa, 
Cargill, DOW and DuPont, which carry out more 
export transactions and exercise globalized activities, 
are inclined to carry out transactions (JVs and 
acquisitions) on a worldwide basis (or region-wide, in 
the Americas, Europe, etc.), impacting directly or 
indirectly their transactions in the host country. 
However, based on the analysis conducted, it was not 
possible to confirm the theory that such companies 
would be inclined to make greenfield investments or 
vice versa, or would be inclined, during their 
expansion process, to “return” to the preferred 
expansion method. 
5. CONCLUSION 
We found evidence that support for the Bundling 
Model (Hennart, 2009) in Brazil. Brazilian regional 
differences are relevant for MNEs sequential 
expansion decision even if they own large previous 
experience in the country. Most expansion 
transactions carried out in “new” Brazilian regions 
involved acquisitions. Considering that the entry in a 
new region would require MNEs to “gain” new access 
to complementary assets, and assuming that these 
assets were embedded in other companies already 
operating in the market (and could be easily 
integrated to other MNE’s assets), the results indicate 
that acquisition was chosen due to the specific 
characteristics of the Brazilian market, especially for 
the huge differences between Brazilian regions. 
For expansions carried out within the regions in 
which MNEs already operate, we noticed that MNEs 
are inclined to make greenfield investments since, 
being already established in the region, they would 
not be required to “gain” new accesses. Other 
factors, however, can also prevent the access of 
MNEs to local complementary assets, such as 
difficulties inherent to the different industries and 
the engagement of the MNEs in new activities other 
than its core activity, causing companies to choose to 
carry out acquisitions and/or JVs. 
Specifically, in the case of JVs, we remarked that 
the counterparty of the JVs established by the MNEs 
to enable their access to local complementary assets 
is not always represented by domestic groups; such 
JVs were also established with other foreign groups 
with previous access to the local complementary 
inputs. 
On the other hand, based on the results obtained, 
we cannot assert that the traditional theories (with 
respect to which the period of experience of the 
MNEs would influence its commitment in the host 
countries and lead them to establish WOSs) were 
confirmed, since it was possible to make such 
assertion only with respect to 4 of the cases (Dixie-
Toga, Dana, Wal-Mart and Whirlpool). Such result 
also shows that MNEs expansion modes are much 
more related to the difficulty or ease to access the 
necessary complementary assets, as predicted by 
Hennart (2009), than to its experience considered 
alone. 
Furthermore, it was possible to note that 
companies with a more global and “multi-domestic” 
production, as defined by Harzing (2002), indeed 
show different strategies upon their expansion; 
however, it is not possible to assert that such 
differentiation would lead to more acquisitions or 
greenfields by one or another.  
Finally, this study has some limitations. We 
discussed earlier learning experience, but we did not 
differentiate the form of these experiences within the 
10 major US major groups in Brazil. For example, 
DOW started to operate in Brazil in 1956, and 
DuPont, in 1937 (Table 3), whereas Plascar only 
started to be controlled by MNEs in 1995 (initially by 
other foreign groups and, in 2006, by US IAC group). 
We also did not fully used quantitative methods to 
discuss more local complementary asset variable like 
regional market concentration, which could reach 
more wide-ranging conclusions on MNEs expansion 
in Brazil and be applied to other countries with similar 
characteristics (emerging countries, with continental 
size and significant regional disparities). 
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A teoria tradicional dos modos de expansão argumenta que a experiência local 
pode contribuir com as organizações multinacionais (MNEs) de forma a 
promover maior conhecimento das particularidades do mercado local, 
mitigando seu risco de expansão local e escolhendo sua forma de entrada entre 
uma subsidiária greenfield e integral. No entanto, os insumos complementares 
locais se tornam  relevantes nesta decisão de expansão se os ativos 
complementares locais nem sempre estiverem disponíveis e negociados 
livremente (Hennart, 2009). Este artigo analisa a decisão de expansão sequencial 
feita por dez relevantes multinacionais americanas de grande porte com 
experiência de atuação no Brasil entre 2004 e 2013, identificando os possíveis 
motivos para essa decisão, bem como considerando as teorias de expansão das 
multinacionais e suas diferenças entre as interregiões brasileiras. Destacam-se 
as seguintes evidências em apoio ao modelo de Hennart Bundling: i) a 
experiência das multinacionais no Brasil nem sempre aumenta o compromisso 
das multinacionais nos países hospedeiros através do estabelecimento de novas 
subsidiárias integrais; ii) as multinacionais norte-americanas realizam aquisições 
quando precisam se estabelecer em uma nova região com significativa diferença 
de desenvolvimento econômico local de onde a MNE já operou; iii) 
adicionalmente, fatores regionais brasileiros, como a concentração, o 
crescimento e as características intrínsecas das indústrias são determinantes às 
aquisições e às escolhas de joint ventures. 
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